本帖最后由 江南小雨11 于 2012-5-31 12:57 編輯
The "Special Relationship "with America The debate about the "specialness" of the Anglo-American special relationship.has drawn the attention of many scholars (Baylis, 1998; Danchev, 1998; Reynolds,1985). While the term special relationship may be conceptually inappropriate,its connotation is less ambiguous. While it is common to trace its origin back to the Anglo-American rapprochement at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth century,it is usually taken to have originated in the unprecedentedly close alliance during the Second World War (Allen, 1954; Anderson, 1981; Perkins, 1969). That alliance began as one between relatively equal partners facing a common fascist threat and transformed afterwards into a close cooperation against the Communist threat. By the mid-course of the wartime partnership, however, the balance of power within the alliance had shifted considerably in favour of the US. While America emerged from the war as a super power, Britain became economically weak and faced decline. As former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Jan Lodal boasted: .Virtually no conceivable combination of powers can challenge America.s conventional military might. The economic strength of the United States touches every corner of the earth. Its veto over almost every major multilateral institution means that no concerted action can be taken without America.s agreement (Lodal, 2001: 119). The British found it increasingly necessary to attach themselves closely to the Americans. This way, the British hoped to be able to influence the direction of US foreign policy, and thus use American power to promote British interests and influence. This objective gave a new meaning to the British notion of a .special relationship. with America. In this sense, the .special relationship. has been, as Reynolds notes, .a deliberate British creation.a .tradition. invented as a tool of diplomacy.. It has been .a device used by a declining power for trying to harness a rising power to service its own ends (Baylis, 1998: 119.25; Reynolds, 1985: 2). The cultivation of American friendship has, however, entailed certain sacrifices and constraints for Britain. Britain has always sought to avoid public confrontation with America; instead, it actively supports it openly while manipulating and trying to influence in private. The British diplomatic motto has become, in effect, .never say .No., say .Yes, but.. (Reynolds, 1988: 98). This tendency has created or re-inforced the image of British obsequiousness to the US.Of course, the special relationship. has been enriched by shared history,ideology and a socio-cultural and linguistic heritage. However, even after the Cold War, what sets the Anglo-American .special relationship. apart from America.s special relations with say, Israel or South Korea, is the degree of intimate collaboration in the diplomatic, intelligence, defence and especially nuclear fields. Britain has a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and America could always count on British support there. Britain also provides important and secure military bases and sites for crucial intelligence gathering facilities for the US. On the other hand, Britain.s nuclear power status, its nuclear arsenal from the Polaris to the Trident submarines is dependent on American technology. Without Britain.s privileged access to the American technology (no other country receives this), British nuclear deterrence would become almost useless for the effectiveness of British submarines depends on American ballistic rockets, cruise missiles, guiding systems and intelligence (Baylis,1984; Campbell, 1986; Clark, 1994; Dumbrell, 2001). This close relationship, as critics argue, appears to have imposed constraints on British diplomacy as the British seem unwilling to openly confront or antagonize America. In fact, British interest has come to be regarded as synonymous with support for American policies. While these political and strategic constraints could have made it difficult for Britain to oppose the US invasion of Iraq, Blair, just like Harold Wilson during the Vietnam War, could still have offered broad verbal support without committing the British .Black Watch. fight in Iraq alongwith US forces. Britain.s very close diplomatic, intelligence and defence cooperation with the US made any rift or confrontation with the US undesirable. This, as shown, is understandable as there is as yet no immediate alternative to Britain.s dependence on America in the field of defence (especially nuclear) (Martin and Garnett, 1997). America.s dominant power, especially its military supremacy, is an empirical reality. In terms of defence expenditure, the US spent .more than $1 billion daily in 2002.2003., while .the European NATO allies. combined budget fell to about $159 billion in 2001. (Nelson, 2002: 56). Unless you are actually saying .Stop the world, we want to get off., there isn.t anything that can be done about the fact that America has this power. The question is how do we relate to America in the most constructive way possible and what influence can we bring to bear to ensure that this power is used for the better? (The Observer, 16 November 2003). Thus, the belief that British interest is best served by closeness with the US has survived over decades, and has remained central to British foreign policy and conception of the .special relationship. (Danchev, 2003; Reynolds, 1985). This tradition. has continued under Blair. David Manning, Blair.s former foreign policy advisor and later ambassador to Washington, has given expression to this by advancing what is regarded as the .guiding principle. of British foreign policy.This principle reflects essentially the familiar policy of overt support for the US,moderated by private candour. In Manning.s words: .At the best of times, Britain.s influence on the US is limited. But the only way we exercise that influence is by attaching ourselves firmly to them and avoiding public criticism wherever possible.(Kampfner, 2003: 17). This pervasive guiding principle could have influenced British policy towards the support of US objectives with regard to Iraq. But there is a clear indication that the extent of Blair.s personal commitment to supporting America, and the magnitude of that support.culminating in the risky, controversial and costly participation in the invasion.was substantially driven by Blair.s own convictions.
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